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We study the existence of different notions of value in two-person zero-
sum repeated games where the state evolves and players receive signals. We
provide some examples showing that the limsup value (and the uniform value)
may not exist in general. Then we show the existence of the value for any
Borel payoff function if the players observe a public signal including the
actions played. We also prove two other positive results without assumptions
on the signaling structure: the existence of the sup value in any game and the
existence of the uniform value in recursive games with nonnegative payoffs.
1. Introduction. The aim of this article is to study two-player zero-sum gen-
eral repeated games with signals (sometimes called “stochastic games with partial
observation”). At each stage, each player chooses some action in a finite set. This
generates a stage reward then a new state and new signals are randomly chosen
through a transition probability depending on the current state and actions, and
with finite support. Shapley [26] studied the special case of standard stochastic
games where the players observe, at each stage, the current state and the past ac-
tions. There are several ways to analyze these games. We will distinguish two
approaches: Borelian evaluation and uniform value.
In this article, we will mainly use a point of view coming from the literature
on determinacy of multistage games (Gale and Stewart [3]). One defines a func-
tion, called evaluation, on the set of plays (infinite histories) and then studies the
existence of a value in the normal form game where the payoff is given by the ex-
pectation of the evaluation, with respect to the probability induced by the strategies
of the players. Several evaluations will be considered.
In the initial model of Gale and Stewart [3] of two-person zero-sum multistage
game with perfect information, there is no state variable. The players choose, one
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after the other, an action from a finite set and both observe the previous choices.
Given a subset A of the set of plays (in this framework: infinite sequences of ac-
tions), player 1 wins if and only if the actual play belongs to the set A: the payoff
function is the indicator function of A. Gale and Stewart proved that the game is
determined: either player 1 has a winning strategy or player 2 has a winning strat-
egy, in the case where A is open or closed with respect to the product topology.
This result was then extended to more and more general classes of sets until Martin
[15] proved the determinacy for every Borel set. When A is an arbitrary subset of
plays, Gale and Stewart [3] showed that the game may be not determined.
In 1969, Blackwell [1] studied the case (still without state variable) where the
players play simultaneously and are told their choices. Due to the lag of infor-
mation, the determinacy problem is not well defined. Instead, one investigates the
probability that the play belongs to some subset A. When A is a Gδ-set, a count-
able intersection of open sets, Blackwell proved that there exists a real number v,
the value of the game, such that for each ε > 0, player 1 can ensure that the prob-
ability of the event: “the play is in A” is greater than v − ε, whereas player 2 can
ensure that it is less than v + ε.
The extension of this result to Shapley’s model (i.e., with a state variable) was
done by Maitra and Sudderth. They focus on the specific evaluation where the pay-
off is the largest stage reward obtained infinitely often. They prove the existence
of a value, called limsup value, in the countable framework [10], in the Borelian
framework [11] and in a finitely additive setting [12]. In the first two cases, they
assume some finiteness of the action set (for one of the players). Their result es-
pecially applies to finite stochastic games where the global payoff is the limsup of
the mean expected payoff.
Blackwell’s existence result was generalized by Martin [16] to any Borel-
measurable evaluation, whereas Maitra and Sudderth [13] extended it further to
stochastic games in the finitely additive setting. In all these results, the players
observe the past actions and the current state.
Another notion used in the study of stochastic games (where a play generates
a sequence of rewards) is the uniform value where some uniformity condition is
required. Basically, one looks at the largest amount that can be obtained by a given
strategy for a family of evaluations (corresponding to longer and longer games).
There are examples where the uniform value does not exist: Lehrer and Sorin [9]
describe such a game with a countable set of states and only one player, having a
finite action set. On the other hand, Rosenberg, Solan and Vieille [23] proved the
existence of the uniform value in partial observation Markov Decision Processes
(one player) when the set of states and the set of actions are finite. This result was
extended by Renault [21] to general action space.
The case of stochastic games with standard signaling, that is, where the players
observes the state and the actions played has been treated by Mertens and Neyman
[18]. They proved the existence of a uniform value for games with a finite set of
states and finite sets of actions. In fact, their proof also shows the existence of a
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value for the limsup of the mean payoff, as studied in Maitra and Sudderth and that
both values are equal.
The aim of this paper is to provide new existence results when the players are
observing only signals on state and actions. In Section 2, we define the model and
present several specific Borel evaluations. We then prove the existence of a value
in games where the evaluation of a play is the largest stage reward obtained along
it, called sup evaluation and study several examples where the limsup value does
not exist.
Section 3 is the core of this paper. We focus on the case of symmetric signaling
structure: multistage games where both players have the same information at each
stage, and prove that a value exists for any Borel evaluation. For the proof, we
introduce an auxiliary game where the players observe the state and the actions
played and we apply the generalization of Martin’s result to standard stochastic
games. Finally, in Section 4, we introduce formally the notion of uniform value
and prove its existence in recursive games with nonnegative payoffs.
2. Repeated game with signals and Borel evaluation. Given a set X, we
denote by f (X) the set of probabilities with finite support on X. For any element
x ∈X, δx stands for the Dirac measure concentrated on x.
2.1. Model. A repeated game form with signals  = (X, I, J,C,D,π, q) is
defined by a set of states X, two finite sets of actions I and J , two sets of signals
C and D, an initial distribution π ∈ f (X × C × D) and a transition function q
from X× I × J to f (X×C ×D). A repeated game with signals (,g) is a pair
of a repeated game form and a reward function g from X × I × J to [0,1].
This corresponds to the general model of repeated game introduced in Mertens,
Sorin and Zamir [19].
The game is played as follows. First, a triple (x1, c1, d1) is drawn according
to the probability π . The initial state is x1, player 1 learns c1 whereas player 2
learns d1. Then, independently, player 1 chooses an action i1 in I and player 2
chooses an action j1 in J . A new triple (x2, c2, d2) is drawn according to the prob-
ability distribution q(x1, i1, j1), the new state is x2, player 1 learns c2, player 2
learns d2 and so on. At each stage n players choose actions in and jn and a triple
(cn+1, dn+1, xn+1) is drawn according to q(xn, in, jn), where xn is the current
state, inducing the signals received by the players and the state at the next stage.
For each n≥ 1, we denote by Hn = (X×C ×D× I × J )n−1 ×X×C ×D the
set of finite histories of length n, by H 1n = (C × I )n−1 × C the set of histories of
length n for player 1 and by H 2n = (D× J )n−1 ×D the set of histories of length n
for player 2. Let H =⋃n≥1 Hn.
Assuming perfect recall, a behavioral strategy for player 1 is a sequence σ =
(σn)n≥1, where σn, the strategy at stage n, is a mapping from H 1n to (I), with the
interpretation that σn(h) is the lottery on actions used by player 1 after h ∈H 1n . In
ON VALUES OF REPEATED GAMES WITH SIGNALS 405
particular, the strategy σ1 at stage 1 is simply a mapping from C to (I) giving
the law of the first action played by player 1 as a function of his initial signal.
Similarly, a behavorial strategy for player 2 is a sequence τ = (τn)n≥1, where τn
is a mapping from H 2n to (J). We denote by 
 and T the sets of behavioral
strategies of player 1 and player 2, respectively.
If for every n ≥ 1 and h ∈ H 1n , σn(h) is a Dirac measure then the strategy is
pure. A mixed strategy is a distribution over pure strategies.
Note that since the initial distribution π and the transition q have finite support
and the sets of actions are finite, there exists a finite subset H 0n ⊂ Hn such that for
all strategies (σ, τ ) the set of histories that are reached at stage n with a positive
probability is included in H 0n .
Hence, no additional measurability assumptions on the strategies are needed. It
is standard that a pair of strategies (σ, τ ) induces a probability Pσ,τ on the set of
plays H∞ = (X ×C ×D × I × J )∞ endowed with the σ -algebra H∞ generated
by the cylinders above the elements of H . We denote by Eσ,τ the corresponding
expectation.
Historically, the first models of repeated games assumed that both cn+1 and dn+1
determine (in, jn) (standard signalling on the moves also called “full monitoring”).
A stochastic game corresponds to the case where in addition the state is known:
both cn+1 and dn+1 contain xn+1.
A game with incomplete information corresponds to the case where in addition
the state is fixed: x1 = xn,∀n, but not necessarily known by the players.
Several extensions have been proposed and studied; see, for example, Neyman
and Sorin [20] in particular Chapters 3, 21, 25, 28.
It has been noticed since Kohlberg and Zamir [7] that games with incomplete in-
formation, when the information is symmetric: cn+1 = dn+1 and contains (in, jn),
could be analyzed by introducing an auxiliary stochastic game. However, the state
variable in this auxiliary stochastic game is no longer xn ∈ X but the (common)
conditional probability on X given the signals, that can be computed by the play-
ers: namely the law of xn in (X). Since then, this approach has been extended;
see, for example, Sorin [29], Ghosh et al. [5] and the analysis in the current arti-
cle shows that general repeated games with symmetric information are the natural
extension of standard stochastic games.
2.2. Borel evaluation and results. We now describe several ways to evaluate
each play and the corresponding concepts. We follow the multistage game deter-
minacy literature and define an evaluation function f on infinite plays. Then we
study the existence of the value of the normal form game (
,T , f ). We will con-
sider especially four evaluations: the general Borel evaluation, the sup evaluation,
the limsup evaluation and the limsup-mean evaluation.
A Borel evaluation is a H∞-measurable function from the set of plays H∞ to
[0,1].
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DEFINITION 1. Given an evaluation f , the game  has a value if
sup
σ
inf
τ
Eσ,τ (f ) = inf
τ
sup
σ
Eσ,τ (f ).
This real number is called the value and denoted by v(f ).
Given a repeated game (,g), we will study several specific evaluations defined
through the stage payoff function g.
2.2.1. Borel evaluation: sup evaluation. The first evaluation is the supremum
evaluation where a play is evaluated by the largest payoff obtained along it.
DEFINITION 2. γ s is the sup evaluation defined by
∀h ∈H∞, γ s(h)= sup
n≥1
g(xn, in, jn).
In (
,T , γ s), the max min, the min max, and the value (called the sup value if it
exists) are, respectively, denoted by vs , vs and vs .
The specificity of this evaluation is that for every n ≥ 1, the maximal stage
payoff obtained before n is a lower bound of the evaluation on the current play.
We prove that the sup value always exists.
THEOREM 3. A repeated game (,g) with the sup evaluation has a value vs .
For the proof, we use the following result. We call strategic evaluation a func-
tion F from 
 × τ to [0,1]. It is clear that an evaluation f induces naturally a
strategic evaluation by F(σ, τ)= Eσ,τ (f ).
PROPOSITION 4. Let (Fn)n≥1 be an increasing sequence of strategic evalua-
tions from 
 × τ to [0,1] that converges to some function F . Assume that:
• 
 and τ are compact convex sets,
• for every n≥ 1, Fn(σ, ·) is lower semicontinuous and quasiconvex on τ for every
σ ∈
,
• for every n ≥ 1, Fn(·, τ ) is upper semicontinuous and quasiconcave on 
 for
every τ ∈ τ .
Then the normal form game (
, τ,F ) has a value v.
A more general version of this proposition can be found in Mertens, Sorin and
Zamir [19] (Part A, Exercise 2, Section 1.f, page 10).
PROOF OF THEOREM 3. Let n≥ 1 and define the strategic evaluation Fn by
Fn(σ, τ )= Eσ,τ
(
sup
t≤n
g(xt , it , jt )
)
.
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Players remember their own previous actions so by Kuhn’s theorem [8], there is
equivalence between mixed strategies and behavioral strategies. The sets of mixed
strategies are naturally convex. The set of histories of length n having positive
probability is finite and, therefore, the set of pure strategies is finite. For every n≥
1, the function Fn(σ, τ ) is thus the linear extension of a finite game. In particular
Fn(σ, ·) is lower semicontinuous and quasiconvex on τ for every σ ∈
 and upper
semicontinuous and quasiconcave on 
 for every τ ∈ τ .
Finally, the sequence (Fn)n≥1 is increasing to
F(σ, τ)= Eπ,σ,τ
(
sup
t
g(xt , it , jt )
)
.
It follows from Proposition 4 that the game  with the sup evaluation has a
value. 
2.2.2. Borel evaluation: limsup evaluation. Several authors have especially
focused on the limsup evaluation and the limsup-mean evaluation.
DEFINITION 5. γ ∗ is the limsup evaluation defined by
∀h ∈H∞, γ ∗(h)= lim sup
n
g(xn, in, jn).
In (
,T , γ ∗), the max min, the min max, and the value (called the limsup value,
if it exists) are, respectively, denoted by v∗, v∗ and v∗.
DEFINITION 6. γ ∗m is the limsup-mean evaluation defined by
∀h ∈H∞, γ ∗m(h) = lim sup
n
1
n
n∑
t=1
g(xt , it , jt ).
In (
,T , γ ∗m), the max min, the min max, and the value (called the limsup-mean
value, if it exists) are, respectively, denoted by v∗m, v∗m and v∗m.
The limsup-mean evaluation is closely related to the limsup evaluation. Indeed,
the analysis of the limsup-mean evaluation of a stochastic game can be reduced to
the study of the limsup evaluation of an auxiliary stochastic game having as set of
states the set of finite histories of the original game.
These evaluations were especially studied by Maitra and Sudderth [10, 11]. In
[10], they proved the existence of the limsup value in a stochastic game with a
countable set of states and finite sets of actions when the players observe the state
and the actions played. Next, they extended in [11] this result to Borel measurable
evaluation.
We aim to study potential extensions of their results to repeated game with
signals. In general, a repeated game with signals has no value with respect to the
limsup evaluation as shown in the following three examples. In each case, we also
show that the limsup-mean value does not exist.
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EXAMPLE 1. We consider a recursive game where the players observe neither
the state nor the action played by the other player. We say that the players are in
the dark.
This example, due to Shmaya, is also described in Rosenberg, Solan and Vieille
[25] and can be interpreted as “pick the largest integer.”
The set of states is finite X = {s1, s2, s3,0∗,1∗,−1∗,2∗,−2∗}, the action set of
player 1 is I = {T ,B}, the action set of player 2 is J = {L,R}, and the transition
is given by
L R L R L R
T
B
(
s1 −2∗
s1 −2∗
) (
s2 1/2
(−1∗)+ 1/2(s3)
1/2
(
1∗
)+ 1/2(s1) 0∗
) (
s3 s3
2∗ 2∗
)
s1 s2 s3
.
The payoff is 0 in states s1,s2, and s3. For example, if the state is s2, player 1
plays T and player 2 plays R then with probability 1/2 the payoff is −1 forever,
and with probability 1/2 the next state is s3. States denoted with a star are absorb-
ing states: if state k∗ is reached, then the state is k∗ for the remaining of the game
and the payoff is k.
CLAIM. The game which starts in s2 has no limsup value: v∗ = −1/2 <
1/2 = v∗.
Since the game is recursive, the limsup-mean evaluation and the limsup eval-
uation coincide, so there is no limsup-mean value either. It also follows that the
uniform value, defined formally in Section 4, does not exist.
PROOF OF CLAIM. The situation is symmetric, so we consider what player 1
can guarantee.
After player 1 plays B , the game is essentially over from player 1’s viewpoint:
either absorption occurs or the state moves to s1 where player 1’s actions are ir-
relevant. Therefore, the only relevant past history in order to define a strategy of
player 1 corresponds to all his past actions being T . A strategy of player 1 is thus
specified by the probability εn to play B for the first time at stage n; let ε∗ be the
probability that player 1 plays T forever.
Player 2 can reply as follows: fix ε > 0, and consider N such that
∑∞
n=N εn ≤ ε.
Define the strategy τ which plays L until stage N − 1 and R at stage N . For any
n >N , we have
Es2,σ,τ
(
g(xn, in, jn)
)≤ ε∗(−1/2)+ (N−1∑
n=1
εn
)
(−1/2)+ ε(1/2) ≤ −1/2 + ε.
It follows that player 1 cannot guarantee more than −1/2 in the limsup sense. 
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EXAMPLE 2. We consider a recursive game where one player is more in-
formed than the other: player 2 observes the state variable and the past actions
played whereas player 1 observes neither the state nor the actions played.
This structure of information has been studied, for example, by Rosenberg,
Solan, and Vieille [24], Renault [22] and Gensbittel, Oliu-Barton and Venel [4].
They proved the existence of the uniform value under the additional assumption
that the more informed player controls the evolution of the beliefs of the other
player on the state variable.
The set of states is finite X = {s2, s3,0∗,1/2∗,−1∗,2∗}, the action set of player
1 is I = {T ,B}, the action set of player 2 is J = {L,R}, and the transition is given
by
L R L R
T
B
(
s2 1/2
(−1∗)+ 1/2(s3)
(−1/2)∗ 0∗
) (
s3 s3
2∗ 2∗
)
s2 s3
.
We focus on the game which starts in s2. Both players can guarantee 0 in the sup
evaluation: player 2 by playing L forever and player 1 by playing T at the first
stage and then B forever. Since the game is recursive, the limsup-mean evaluation
and the limsup evaluation are equals.
CLAIM. The game which starts in s2 has no limsup value: v∗ = −1/2 <
−1/6 = v∗.
PROOF. The computation of the max min with respect to the limsup-mean
evaluation is similar to the computation of Example 1. The reader can check that
player 1 cannot guarantee more than −1/2.
We now prove that the min max is equal to −1/6. Contrary to Example 1, player
2 observes the state and actions, nevertheless the game is from his point of view
strategically finished as soon as B or R is played: if B is played then absorption
occurs, if R is played then either absorption occurs or the state moves to s3 where
player 2’s action are irrelevant. Therefore, when defining the strategy of player 2
at stage n, the only relevant past history is (s2, T ,L)n and a strategy of player 2 is
defined by the probability εn that he plays R for the first time at stage n and the
probability ε∗ that he plays L forever.
Fix ε > 0, and consider N such that
∑∞
n=N εn ≤ ε. Player 1’s replies can be
reduced to the two following strategies: σ1 which plays T forever and, σ2 which
plays T until stage N − 1 and B at stage N . All the other strategies are yielding a
payoff smaller with an ε-error. The strategy σ1 yields 0ε∗ + (1 − ε∗)(−1/2) and
the strategy σ2 yields (−1/2)ε∗ + (1 − ε∗)1/2 − ε.
The previous payoff functions are almost the payoff of the two-by-two game
where player 1 chooses σ1 or σ2 and player 2 chooses either never to play R or to
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play R at least once: ( 0 −1/2
−1/2 1/2
)
.
The value of this game is −1/6, giving the result. 
EXAMPLE 3. In the previous examples, the state is not known to at least one
player.
The following game is a variant of the Big Match introduced by Blackwell and
Ferguson [2]. It is an absorbing game: every state except one are absorbing. Since
there is only one state where players can influence the transition and the payoff, the
knowledge of the state is irrelevant. Players can always consider that the current
state is the nonabsorbing state.
We assume that player 2 observes the past actions played whereas player 1 does
not (in the original version, both player 1 and player 2 were observing the state
and past actions):
L R
T
B
(
1∗ 0∗
0 1
)
.
CLAIM. The game with the sup evaluation has a value vs = 1. The game with
the limsup evaluation and the game with the limsup-mean evaluation do not have
a value: v∗ = v∗m = 0 < 1/2 = v∗m = v∗.
PROOF. We first prove the existence of the value with respect to the sup eval-
uation. Player 1 can guarantee the payoff 1. Let ε > 0, and σ be the strategy which
plays T with probability ε and B with probability 1 − ε. This strategy yields a
sup evaluation greater than 1 − ε. Since 1 is the maximum payoff, it is the value:
vs = 1.
We now focus on the limsup evaluation and the limsup-mean evaluation.
After player 1 plays T absorption occurs. Therefore, the only relevant past his-
tory in order to define a strategy of player 1 corresponds to all his past actions
being B . Let εn be the probability that player 1 plays T for the first time at stage n
and ε∗ be the probability that player 1 plays B forever.
Player 2 can reply as follows: fix ε > 0, and consider N such that
∑∞
n=N εn ≤ ε.
Define the strategy τ which plays R until stage N − 1 and L at stage N . For any
n >N , we have
Es,σ,τ
(
g(xn, in, jn)
)≤ ε∗0 + (N−1∑
n=1
εn
)
0 + ε(1) ≤ ε.
Let us compute what player 2 can guarantee with respect to the limsup evalu-
ation. The computation is similar for the limsup-mean evaluation. First, player 2
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can guarantee 1/2 by playing the following mixed strategy: with probability 1/2,
play L at every stage and with probability 1/2, play R at every stage.
We now prove that it is the best payoff that player 2 can achieve. Fix a strategy
τ for player 2 and consider the induced law P on the set H∞ = {L,R}∞ of infinite
sequences of L and R induced by τ when player 1 plays B at every stage. Denote
by βn the probability that player 2 plays L at stage n. If there exists a stage N
such that βN ≥ 1/2, then playing B until N − 1 and T at stage N yields a payoff
greater than 1/2 to player 1. If for every n, βn ≤ 1/2, then the stage payoff is
in expectation greater than 1/2 when player 1 plays B . Therefore, the expected
limsup payoff is greater than 1/2. 
3. Symmetric repeated game with Borel evaluation. Contrary to the sup
evaluation, in general the existence of the value for a given evaluation depends
on the signaling structure. In Section 2, we analyzed three games without limsup-
mean value. In this section, we prove that if the signaling structure is symmetric as
defined next, the value always exists in every Borel evaluation.
3.1. Model and results.
DEFINITION 7. A symmetric signaling repeated game form is a repeated game
form with signals  = (X, I, J,C,D,π, q) such that there exists a set S with C =
D = I × J × S satisfying
∀(x, i, j) ∈X × I × J, ∑
s,x′
q(x, i, j)
(
x′, (i, j, s), (i, j, s)
)= 1
and the initial distribution π is also symmetric: π(x, c, d) > 0 implies c = d .
Intuitively, at each stage of a symmetric signaling repeated game form, the play-
ers observe both actions played and a public signal s. It will be convenient to write
such a game form as a tuple  = (X, I, J, S,π, q) and since for such a game:
q(x, i, j)(x ′, (i ′, j ′, s′), (i′′, j ′′, s′′)) > 0 only if i = i′ = i′′ and j = j ′ = j ′′ and
s′ = s ′′, without loss of generality, we can and will write q(x, i, j)(x′, s) as a
shorthand for q(x, i, j)(x′, (i, j, s), (i, j, s)). With this notation q(x, i, j) and the
initial distribution π are elements of f (X×S). The set of observed plays is then
V∞ = (S × I × J )∞.
THEOREM 8. Let  be a symmetric signaling repeated game form. For every
Borel evaluation f , the game  has a value.
COROLLARY 9. A symmetric signaling repeated game (,g) has a limsup
value and a limsup-mean value.
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3.2. Proof of Theorem 8. Let us first give an outline of the proof. Given a
symmetric signaling repeated game form  and a Borel evaluation f , we construct
an auxiliary standard stochastic game ̂ (where the players observe the state and
the actions) and a Borel evaluation f̂ on the corresponding set of plays. We use
the existence of the value in the game ̂ with respect to the evaluation f̂ to deduce
the existence of the value in the original game.
The difficult point is the definition of the evaluation f̂ . The key idea is to de-
fine a conditional probability with respect to the σ -algebra of observed plays. For
a given probability on plays, the existence of such conditional probability is easy
since the sets involved are Polish. In our case, the difficulty comes from the neces-
sity to have the same conditional probability for any of the probability distributions
that could be generated by the strategies of the players (Sections 3.3.2–3.3.4). (As
remarked by a referee the observed plays generate in fact a sufficient statistic for
the plays with respect to all these distributions.) The definition of the conditional
probability is achieved in three steps: we first define the conditional probability
of a finite history with respect to a finite observed history, then we use a martin-
gale result to define the conditional probability of a finite history with respect to
an observed play and finally we rely on Kolmogorov extension theorem to con-
struct a conditional probability on plays. Finally, we introduce the function f̂ on
the observed plays as the integral of f with respect to this conditional probabil-
ity.
After introducing few notations we prove the existence of the value by defining
the game ̂, assuming the existence of the function f̂ (Lemma 10). The next three
sections will be dedicated to the construction of the conditional probability, then to
the definition and properties of the function f̂ for any Borelian payoff function f .
Let  be a symmetric signaling repeated game form, we do not assume the
Borel evaluation to be given.
3.3. Notation. Let Hn = (X×S × I × J )n−1 ×X×S, H =⋃n≥1 Hn, the set
of histories and H∞ = (X × S × I × J )∞, the set of plays.
For all h ∈H∞, define h|n ∈Hn as the projection of h on the n first stages.
For all hn ∈ Hn, denote by h+n the cylinder generated by hn in H∞: h+n = {h ∈
H∞, h|n = hn} and by Hn the corresponding σ -algebra. H∞ denotes the σ -algebra
generated by
⋃
nHn.
Let Vn = (S × I × J )n−1 × S = H 1n = H 2n , V =
⋃
n≥1 Vn and V∞ = (S × I ×
J )∞.
For all v ∈ V∞, define v|n ∈ Vn as the projection of v on the n first stages.
For all vn ∈ Vn, denote by v+n the cylinder generated by vn in V∞: v+n = {v ∈
V∞, v|n = vn} and by Vn the corresponding σ -algebra. V∞ is the σ -algebra gen-
erated by
⋃
n Vn.
We denote by  the application from H∞ to V∞ which forgets all the states:
more precisely, (x1, s1, i1, j1, . . . , xn, sn, in, jn, . . .) = (s1, i1, j1, . . . , sn, in,
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jn, . . .). We use the same notation for the corresponding application defined from
H to V .
We denote by V∗n (resp., V∗∞) the image of Vn (resp., V∞) by −1 which are
sub σ -algebras of Hn (resp., H∞). Explicitly, for vn ∈ Vn, v∗n denotes the cylinder
generated by vn in H∞: v∗n = {h ∈ H∞,(h)|n = vn}, V∗n are the corresponding
σ -algebras and V∗∞ the σ -algebra generated by their union.
Any Vn (resp., V∞)-measurable function  on V∞ induces a V∗n (resp., V∗∞)-
measurable function  ◦ on H∞.
Define α from H to [0,1] where for hn = (x1, s1, i1, j1, . . . , xn, sn):
α(hn)= π(x1, s1)
n−1∏
t=1
q(xt , it , jt )(xt+1, st+1)
and β from V to [0,1] where for vn = (s1, i1, j1, . . . , sn):
β(vn)=
∑
hn∈Hn;(hn)=vn
α(hn).
Let Hn = {hn ∈Hn; α(hn) > 0} and V n = (Hn) and recall that these sets are
finite. We introduce now the set of plays and observed plays that can occur during
the game as H∞ =⋂n H+n and V∞ = (H∞) =⋂n V n. Remark that both are
measurable subsets of H∞ and V∞, respectively.
For every pair of strategies (σ, τ ), we denote by Pσ,τ the probability distribution
induced over the set of plays (H∞,H∞) and by Qσ,τ the probability distribution
over the set of observed plays (V∞,V∞). Thus, Qσ,τ is the image of Pσ,τ un-
der . Note that supp(Pσ,τ ) ⊂ H∞. We denote, respectively, by EPσ,τ and EQσ,τ
the corresponding expectations.
It turns out that for technical reasons it is much more convenient to work with
the space V∞ rather than with V∞ (and with H∞ rather than with H∞). And then,
abusing slightly the notation, V∞ and Vn will tacitly denote the restrictions to V∞
of the corresponding σ -algebras defined on V∞. On rare occasions this can lead
to a confusion and then we will write, for example, Vn to denote the σ -algebra
{U ∩ V∞|U ∈ Vn} the restriction of Vn to V∞.
3.3.1. Definition of an equivalent game. Let us define an auxiliary stochastic
game ̂. The sets of actions I and J are the same as in . The set of states is
V =⋃n≥1 Vn and the transition q̂ from V × I × J to (V ) is given by
∀vn ∈ Vn,∀i ∈ I,∀j ∈ J, q̂(vn, i, j)=
∑
s∈S
ψ(vn, i, j, s)δvn,i,j,s ,
where ψ(vn, i, j, s)= β(vn,i,j,s)β(vn) .
Note that if vn ∈ Vn then the support of q̂(vn, i, j) is included in Vn+1, in par-
ticular is finite. Moreover, if q̂(vn, i, j)(vn+1) > 0 then vn+1|n = vn. The initial
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distribution of ̂ is the marginal distribution πS of π on S, if s ∈ S = V1, then
πS(s)=∑x∈X π(x, s) and πS(v) = 0 for v ∈ V \ V1.
Let us note that the original game  and the auxiliary game ̂ have the same
sets of strategies. Indeed a behavioral strategy in  is a mapping from V to proba-
bility distributions over actions. Thus, each behavioral strategy in  is a stationary
strategy in ̂. On the other hand however, each state of ̂ “contains” all previously
visited states and all played actions; thus, for all useful purposes, in ̂ behavioral
strategies and stationary strategies coincide.
Now suppose that (v1, i1, j1, v2, i2, j2, . . .) is a play in ̂. Then vn+1|n = vn for
all n and there exists v ∈ V∞ such that v|n = vn for all n. Thus, defining a payoff
on infinite histories in ̂ amounts to defining a payoff on V∞.
LEMMA 10. Given a Borel function f on H∞, there exists a Borel function f̂
on V∞ such that
EPσ,τ (f ) = EQσ,τ (f̂ ).(1)
Therefore, playing in  with strategies (σ, τ ) and payoff f is the same as play-
ing in ̂ with the same strategies and payoff f̂ .
By Martin [16] or Maitra and Sudderth [14], the stochastic game ̂ with payoff
f̂ has a value implying that  with payoff f has the same value, which completes
the proof of Theorem 8.
The three next sections are dedicated to the proof of Lemma 10.
3.3.2. Regular conditional probability of finite time events with respect to finite
observed histories. For m≥ n≥ 1, we define n,m from H∞ × V∞ to [0,1] by
n,m(h, v)=
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
∑
h′,h′|n=h|n,(h′|m)=v|m α(h
′|m)
β(v|m) , if (h|n)= v|n,
0, otherwise.
This corresponds to the joint probability of the players on the realization of the
history h up to stage n, given the observed history v up to stage m.
Since n,m(h, v) depends only on h|n and v|m, we can see n,m as a function
defined on Hn×V m and note that its support is included in Hn×Vm. On the other
hand, since each set U ∈ Hn is a finite union of cylinders h+n for hn ∈ Hn such
that h+n ⊂ U , n,m can be seen as a mapping from Hn × V∞ into [0,1], where
n,m(U,v) = ∑hn,h+n ⊆U n,m(hn, v). Bearing this last observation in mind, we
have the following.
LEMMA 11. For every m ≥ n ≥ 1, n,m is a probability kernel from
(V∞,Vm) to (H∞,Hn).
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PROOF. Since
∑
hn∈Hn n,m(hn, v) = 1 for v ∈ V∞, n,m(·, v) defines a
probability on Hn. Moreover, for any U ∈ Hn, n,m(U,v) is a function of the
m first components of v hence is Vm-measurable. 
LEMMA 12. Let m≥ n ≥ 1 and (σ, τ ) be a pair of strategies. Then, for every
vm ∈ V m such that Qσ,τ (v+m)= Pσ,τ (v∗m) > 0, and every hn ∈Hn:
Pσ,τ
(
h+n |v∗m
)=n,m(hn, vm).
PROOF. Let vm = (s1, i1, j1, . . . , sm) and hn ∈Hn,
Pσ,τ
(
h+n |v∗m
)
= Pσ,τ (h
+
n ∩ v∗m)
Pσ,τ (v∗m)
=
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
∑
h′,h′|n=hn,θ(h′|m)=vm α(h
′|m)W(i1, j1, . . . , jm−1)
β(vm)W(i1, j1, . . . , jm−1)
, if (hn)= vm|n,
0, otherwise,
where W(i1, j1, . . . , jm−1) = ∏t≤m−1 σ(vm|t )(it )τ (vm|t )(jt ). After simplifica-
tion, we recognize on the right the definition of n,m(vm,hn). 
We deduce the following lemma.
LEMMA 13. For every pair of strategies (σ, τ ), each W ∈ Vm and U ∈Hn we
have
Pσ,τ
(
U ∩−1(W))= ∫
W
n,m(U,v)Qσ,τ (dv).(2)
PROOF. Clearly, it suffices to prove (2) for cylinders U = h+n and W = v+m
with β(vm) > 0.
We have ∫
v+m
n,m(hn, v)Qσ,τ (dv) = n,m(hn, vm)Qσ,τ (v+m)
= Pσ,τ (h+n |v∗m)Qσ,τ (v+m)
= Pσ,τ (h+n |v∗m)Pσ,τ (v∗m)
= Pσ,τ (h+n ∩ v∗m). 
Note that (2) can be equivalently written as: for every pair of strategies (σ, τ ),
each W ∗ ∈ V∗m and U ∈Hn
Pσ,τ
(
U ∩W ∗)= ∫
W ∗
n,m
(
U,(h)
)
Pσ,τ (dh).(3)
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3.3.3. Regular conditional probability of finite time events with respect to in-
finite observed histories. In this paragraph, we prove that instead of defining
one application n,m for every pair (m,n) such that m ≥ n ≥ 1, one can define
a unique probability kernel n from (n,V∞) to (H∞,Hn), with Qσ,τ (n) = 1,
for all (σ, τ ), such that the extension of Lemma 13 holds.
For h ∈H∞, let
h = {v ∈ V∞|n,m(h, v) converges as m ↑ ∞}.
The domain h is measurable (see Kallenberg [6], page 6, e.g.). Recall that h
depends only on h|n and write also h|n for h. Let then
n =
⋂
hn∈Hn
hn.
We define n :H∞ × V∞ → [0,1] by n = limm→∞n,m on H∞ × n and 0
otherwise. As a limit of a sequence of measurable mappings n is measurable (see
Kallenberg [6], page 6, e.g.).
LEMMA 14. (i) For each pair of strategies (σ, τ ), Qσ,τ (n)= 1.
(ii) For each v ∈n, ∑hn∈Hn n(hn, v)= 1.(iii) For each U ∈ Hn the mapping v → n(U,v) is a measurable mapping
from (V∞,V∞) to R.
(iv) For each pair of strategies (σ, τ ), for each U ∈Hn and each W ∈ V∞
Pσ,τ
(
U ∩−1(W))= ∫
W
n(U,v)Qσ,τ (dv).(4)
PROOF. (i) For hn ∈ Hn and each pair of strategies σ, τ we define on H∞ a
sequence of random variables Zhn,m, m≥ n,
Zhn,m = Pσ,τ
[
h+n |V∗m
]
.
As a conditional expectation of a bounded random variable with respect to
an increasing sequence of σ -algebras, Zhn,m is a martingale (with respect to
Pσ,τ ), hence converges Pσ,τ -almost surely and in L1 to the random variable
Zhn = Pσ,τ [h+n |V∗∞].
For m≥ n, we define the mappings ψn,m[hn] :H∞ → [0,1],
ψn,m[hn](h)=n,m(hn,(h)).
Let us show that for each hn ∈ Hn, ψm,n[hn] is a version of the conditional
expectation EPσ,τ [1hn |V∗m] = Pσ,τ [h+n |V∗m]. First note that ψn,m[hn] is (H∞,V∗m)
measurable. Lemma 12 implies that, for h ∈ supp(Pσ,τ ) ⊂ H∞, ψn,m[hn](h) =
n,m(hn,(h)) = Pσ,τ (h+n |v|∗m) = Pσ,τ (h+n |V∗m)(h), where v = (h). Hence, the
claim.
Since ψn,m[hn] is a version of Pσ,τ (h+n |V∗m), its limit ψn[hn] exists and is a
version of Pσ,τ (h+n |V∗∞), Pσ,τ -almost surely. In particular,
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(C1) the set −1(hn) = {h ∈ H∞|limmψn,m[hn](h) exists} is V∗∞ measurable
and has Pσ,τ -measure 1,
(C2) for each W ∗ ∈ V∗∞,
∫
W ∗ ψn[hn](h)Pσ,τ (dh) =
∫
W ∗ E[1h+n |V∗∞]Pσ,τ =
Pσ,τ (W
∗ ∩ h+n ).
Note that (C1) implies that Qσ,τ (n)= 1.
(ii) If v ∈n then, for all hn ∈Hn, n,m(hn, v) converges to n(hn, v). But, by
Lemma 11,
∑
hn∈Hn n,m(hn, v) = 1. The sum being with finitely many nonzero
terms one has
∑
hn∈Hn n(hn, v)= 1.
(iii) Was proved before the lemma.
(iv) Since ∫W n(hn, v)Qσ,τ (dv) = ∫−1(W) ψn[hn](h)Pσ,τ (dh) for W ∈ V∞,
using (C2) we get
Pσ,τ
(
h+n ∩−1(W)
)= ∫
W
n(hn, v)Qσ,τ (dv)
for U ∈ V∞. 
3.3.4. Regular conditional probability of infinite time events with respect to
infinite observed histories. In this section, using Kolmogorov extension theo-
rem we construct from the sequence n of probability kernels from (n,V∞)
to (H∞,Hn), one probability kernel  from (∞,V∞) to (H∞,Hn), with
Qσ,τ (∞)= 1, for all (σ, τ ).
LEMMA 15. There exists a measurable subset ∞ of V∞ such that, for all
strategies σ, τ :
• Qσ,τ (∞)= 1 and
• there exists a probability kernel  from (∞,V∞) to (H∞,H∞) such that for
each W ∈ V∞ and U ∈H∞
Pσ,τ
(
U ∩−1(W))= ∫
W
(U,v)Qσ,τ (dv).(5)
Before proceeding to the proof, some remarks are in order.
A probability kernel having the property given above is called a regular condi-
tional probability.
For given strategies σ and τ , the existence of a transition kernel κα,β from
(V∞,V∞) to (H∞,H∞) such that for each U ∈ V∞ and A ∈H∞
Pσ,τ
(
A∩−1(U))= ∫
U
κσ,τ (A, v)Qσ,τ (dv)
is well known provided that V∞ is a Polish space and V∞ is the Borel σ -algebra.
In the current framework it is easy to introduce an appropriate metric on V∞ such
that this condition is satisfied thus the existence of κσ,τ is immediately assured.
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The difficulty in our case comes from the fact that we look for a regular condi-
tional probability which is common for all probabilities Pσ,τ , where (σ, τ ) range
over all strategies of both players.
PROOF OF LEMMA 15. We follow the notation of the proof of Lemma 14
and define ∞ =⋂n≥1 n. Let (σ, τ ) be a couple of strategies. For every n≥ 1,
Qσ,τ (n) = 1, hence Qσ,τ (∞) = 1. By Lemma 14(ii), given v ∈ ∞, the se-
quence {n(·, v)}n≥1 of probabilities on {(H∞,Hn)}n≥1 is well defined. Let us
show that this sequence satisfies the condition of Kolmogorov’s extension theo-
rem.
In fact n,m(·, v) is defined on the power set of Hn by
∀A⊂Hn, n,m(A,v) =
∑
hn∈A
n,m(hn, v).
Thus, for every hn ∈Hn, we have
n,m(hn, v) = Pσ,τ (v|
∗
m ∩ h+n )
Pσ,τ (v|∗m)
= Pσ,τ (v|
∗
m ∩ (hn × I × J ×X × S)+)
Pσ,τ (v|∗m)
= n+1,m(hn × (I × J ×X × S), v).
Taking the limit, we obtain the same equality for n and n+1 hence the com-
patibility condition. By the Kolmogorov extension theorem for each v ∈ , there
exists a measure (·, v) on (H∞,H∞) such that

(
h+n , v
)=n(h+n , v)
for each n and each hn ∈Hn.
Let us prove that, for each U ∈ H∞, the mapping v → (U,v) is V∞-
measurable on ∞.
Let C be the class of sets A ∈ H∞ such that (A, ·) has this property. By
Lemma 14, C contains the π -system consisting of cylinders generating H∞. To
show that H∞ ⊆ C it suffices to show that C is a λ-system. Let Ai be an increasing
sequence of sets belonging to C. Since, for each v ∈ V∞, (·, v) is a measure,
we have (
⋃
n An, v) = supn (An, v). However, v → supn (An, v) is measur-
able as a supremum of measurable mappings v → (An, v). Let A ⊃ B be two
sets belonging to C. Then (A \B,v)+(B,v)=(A,v) by additivity of mea-
sure and v → (A \ B,v) = (A,v) −(B,v) is measurable as a difference of
measurable mappings.
To prove (5), take a measurable subset W of V∞ and consider the set function
H∞ U →
∫
W
(U,dv)Qσ,τ (dv).
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Since (·, v) is nonnegative this set function is a measure on (H∞,H∞). How-
ever, by Lemma (14), this mapping is equal to U → Pσ,τ (U ∩ −1(W)) for U
belonging to the π -system of cylinders generating H∞. But two measures equal
on a generating π -system are equal, which terminates the proof of (5). 
A standard property of probability kernels and the fact that ∞ has measure 1
imply:
COROLLARY 16. Let f : H∞ → [0,1] be H∞-measurable mapping. Then
the mapping f̂ : V∞ → [0,1] defined by
f̂ (v) =
⎧⎨⎩
∫
H∞
f (h)(dh, v), if v ∈∞,
0, otherwise,
is V∞-measurable and
EPσ,τ [f ] = EQσ,τ [f̂ ] ∀σ, τ.
REMARK 17. In the previous proof, we proceeded through a reduction from a
symmetric repeated game to a stochastic game in order to apply Martin’s existence
result. The same procedure can be applied for N -player repeated games. Let us
consider a N -player symmetric signaling repeated game. One defines a conditional
probability and therefore associates to all Borel payoffs f i on plays, i ∈ N an
associated Borel evaluation f̂ i on the space of observed plays, therefore, reducing
the problem to a N -player stochastic game with Borelian payoffs.
For example, Mertens [17] showed the existence of pure ε-Nash equilibrium in
N -person stochastic games with Borel payoff functions where at each stage at most
one of the players is playing. Using the previous reduction, one can deduce the
existence of pure ε-Nash equilibrium in N -person symmetric repeated games with
Borel payoff functions where at each stage at most one of the players is playing.
4. Uniform value in recursive games with nonnegative payoffs. In Sec-
tion 2 and Section 3, we focused on Borel evaluations. In this last section, we focus
on the family of mean average of the n first stage rewards and the corresponding
uniform value.
DEFINITION 18. For each n≥ 1, the mean expected payoff induced by (σ, τ )
during the first n stages is
γn(σ, τ )= Eσ,τ
(
1
n
n∑
t=1
g(xt , it , jt )
)
.
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DEFINITION 19. Let v be a real number.
A strategy σ ∗ of player 1 guarantees v in the uniform sense in (,g) if for all
η > 0 there exists n0 ≥ 1 such that
∀n≥ n0,∀τ ∈ T , γn(σ ∗, τ )≥ v − η.(6)
Player 1 can guarantee v in the uniform sense in (,g) if for all ε > 0 there exists
a strategy σ ∗ ∈
 which guarantees v − ε in the uniform sense.
A symmetric notion holds for player 2.
DEFINITION 20. The uniform max min, denoted by v∞, is the supremum of
all the payoff that player 1 can guarantee in the uniform sense. A uniform min max
denoted by v∞ is defined in a dual way.
If both players can guarantee v in the uniform sense, then v is the uniform value
of the game (,g) and denoted by v∞.
Many existence results have been proven in the literature concerning the uni-
form value and uniform max min and min max; see, for example, Mertens, Sorin
and Zamir [19] or Sorin [28]. Mertens and Neyman [18] proved that in a stochastic
game with a finite state space and finite actions spaces, where the players observe
past payoffs and the state, the uniform value exists. Moreover, the uniform value
is equal to the limsup-mean value and for every ε > 0 there exists a strategy which
guarantees v∞ − ε both in the limsup-mean sense and in the uniform sense.
In general, the uniform value does not exist (either in games with incomplete
information on both sides or in stochastic games with signals on the actions) and
in particular its existence depends upon the signaling structure.
REMARK 21. For n≥ 1, the n-stage game (n, g) is the zero-sum game with
normal form (
,T , γn) and value vn. It is interesting to note that in the special
case of symmetric signaling repeated games with a finite set of states and finite
set of signals, a uniform value may not exist, since even the sequence of values vn
may not converge (Ziliotto [30]), but there exists a value for any Borel evaluation
by Theorem 8.
We focus now on the specific case of recursive games with nonnegative payoff
defined as follows.
DEFINITION 22. Recall that a state is absorbing if the probability to stay in
this state is 1 for all actions and the payoff is also independent of the actions played.
A repeated game is recursive if the payoff is equal to 0 outside the absorbing states.
If all absorbing payoffs are nonnegative, the game is recursive and nonnegative.
Solan and Vieille [27] have shown the existence of a uniform value in nonneg-
ative recursive games where the players observe the state and past actions played.
We show that the result is true without assumption on the signals to the players.
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In a recursive game, the limsup-mean evaluation and the limsup evaluation coin-
cide. If the recursive game has nonnegative payoffs, the sup evaluation, the limsup
evaluation and the limsup-mean evaluation both coincide. So, Theorem 3 implies
the existence of the value with respect to these evaluations. Using a similar proof,
we obtain the stronger theorem.
THEOREM 23. A recursive game with nonnegative payoffs has a uniform
value v∞, equal to the sup value and the limsup value. Moreover, there exists a
strategy of player 2 that guarantees v∞.
The proof of the existence of the uniform value is similar to the proof of Propo-
sition 4 while using a specific sequence of strategic evaluations.
PROOF OF THEOREM 23. The sequence of stage payoffs is nondecreasing on
each history: 0 until absorption occurs and then constant, equal to some nonnega-
tive real number. In particular, the payoff converges and the limsup can be replaced
by a limit.
Let σ be a strategy of player 1 and τ be a strategy of player 2, then γn(σ, τ )
is nondecreasing in n. This implies that the corresponding sequence of values
(vn)n∈N is nondecreasing in n. Denote v = supn vn and let us show that v is the
uniform value.
Fix ε > 0, consider N such that vN ≥ v − ε and σ ∗ a strategy of player 1 which
is optimal in N . We have for each τ and, for every n≥N ,
γn
(
σ ∗, τ
)≥ γN (σ ∗, τ )≥ vN ≥ v − ε.
Hence, the strategy σ ∗ guarantees v− ε in the uniform sense. This is true for every
positive ε, thus player 1 guarantees v in the uniform sense.
Using the monotone convergence theorem, we also have
γ ∗
(
σ ∗, τ
)= Eσ ∗,τ
(
lim
n
1
n
n∑
t=1
g(xt , it , jt )
)
= lim
n
Eσ ∗,τ
(
1
n
n∑
t=1
g(xt , it , jt )
)
≥ v − ε.
We now show that player 2 can also guarantee v in the uniform sense. Consider
for every n, the set
Kn = {τ,∀σ, γn(σ, τ )≤ v}.
Kn is nonempty because it contains an optimal strategy for player 2 in n (since
vn ≤ v). The set of strategies of player 2 is compact, hence by continuity of the
n-stage payoff γn, Kn is itself compact. γn ≤ γn+1 implies Kn+1 ⊂ Kn hence
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n Kn = ∅: there exists τ ∗ such that for every strategy of player 1, σ and for
every positive integer n, γn(σ, τ )≤ v. It follows that both players can guarantee v,
thus v is the uniform value.
By the monotone convergence theorem, we also have
γ ∗
(
σ, τ ∗
)= Eσ,τ∗
(
lim
n
1
n
n∑
t=1
g(xt , it , jt )
)
= lim
n
Eσ,τ∗
(
1
n
n∑
t=1
g(xt , it , jt )
)
≤ v.
Hence, v is the sup and limsup value. 
REMARK 24. The fact that the sequence of n-stage values (vn)n≥1 is nonde-
creasing is not enough to ensure the existence of the uniform value. For example,
consider the Big Match [2] with no signals: vn = 1/2 for each n, but there is no
uniform value.
REMARK 25. The theorem states the existence of a 0-optimal strategy for
player 2 but player 1 may only have ε-optimal strategies. For example, in the fol-
lowing MDP, there are two absorbing states, two nonabsorbing states with payoff 0
and two actions Top and Bottom:(
1/2(s1)+ 1/2(s2)
0∗
) (
s2
1∗
)
.
s1 s2
The starting state is s1 and player 1 observes nothing. A good strategy is to play
T op for a long time and then Bottom. While playing Bottom, the process absorbs
and with a strictly positive probability the absorption occurs in state s1 with ab-
sorbing payoff 0. So player 1 has no strategy which guarantees the uniform value
of 1.
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